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As noted in the first of this series of publications on Norway 
and the BRICS, the BRICS do not represent a homogeneous 
group of states. That is not to say that the BRICS do not have 
common interests or that they no longer share their outlook 
on the need for a more genuinely multipolar international 
order. The BRICS are in many respects a group of rising pow-
ers with a relatively cohesive reform program for the inter-
national community. Yet, given the important role of Russia 
as a driver of the BRICS cooperation and the current state 
of uncertainty regarding Russia’s role and policies vis-à-vis 
the West, other avenues for cooperation may prove more 
constructive for the “democratic three” of the group – India, 
Brazil and South Africa. 
While this uncertainty may make long-term policies towards 
the BRICS more challenging, it does not follow that the group 
as a whole will be more difficult to cooperate with. Strength-
ening ties to the BRICS is one of Norway’s explicit foreign 
policy goals. The present brief is an attempt at understand-
ing challenges and avenues for cooperation between Norway 
and Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa rather 
than the BRICS as a group. We proceed by summarizing 
Norwegian engagement with these rising powers and seek to 
bring out from their diversity a number of common themes 
relating to Norway’s engagement with them.
The BRICS exhibit diversity across their political systems, 
economies, military strengths and positions in the interna-
tional system.  They nonetheless form an increasingly insti-
tutionalised grouping of regional powers. And while Norway 
represents a small market for the BRICS, most of the BRICS 
are important trading partners for Norway. Presented first 
is the relative scale of Norway’s trade with the BRICS. The 
figures are based on the UN Comtrade Database:
[ 9 / 2015 ]
Summary
This brief addresses the relationship between Nor-
way and the BRICS. Our aim here is to understand 
the challenges and avenues for cooperation between 
Norway and Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa rather than the BRICS as a group. 
While Norway represents a small market for the 
BRICS, most of the BRICS are important trading part-
ners for Norway. As we show here, there is a need for 
Norway to engage strategically with these countries. 
While some of them, such as Brazil and South Africa 
represent cases where cooperation is going well, and 
where mutual interests are served by current arrange-
ments, we need to keep in mind the extent to which 
such a state of affairs builds on long-term coopera-
tion on key issues of mutual interest. 
The situation with Russia is on-going, but points to 
the need for Norway to strengthen multilateral arenas 
in which to engage with Russia. Norway has success-
fully engaged with Russia in low-key cooperation of 
issues of mutual concern in the past and in this way 
fostered increased cooperation in other issue-areas. 
This may be a strategy that Norway should continue. 
With China, the relationship is normalizing. However, 
as China becomes more involved in the Arctic, Norway 
could easily again land in a position where its stated 
position on a specific issue may lead to a more tense 
relationship.
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Imports to Norway (11.9 $B total)
Exports from Norway (5.6 $B total)
1 For example, the Bolsa Famila is a poverty reduction programme based on finan-
cial transfers that “may be the most well-developed national, universalistic and 
programmatic social policy in Brazilian history” (Montero 2014:141).
Norway’s involvement with the BRICS should therefore not 
be spread along the foreign policy spectrum as a whole, but 
rather be issue-specific and concentrate on a few areas where 
Norway can be an important partner with the BRICS countries. 
Such policies should in turn be based on a broad overview of 
issue areas. In providing an overview of Norway’s relationship 
with each of the five countries, we assess the security, trade and 
reputational issues at stake.  These issues are in some cases 
complementary and in others conflictual.  The table below pro-
vides a traffic-light style snapshot of the current situation, with 
issues highlighted in red assessed as particularly challenging:
Brazil: Shared energy interests, shared multilateral 
outlook
The relationship between Brazil and Norway is relatively strong, 
driven in the main by trade and investment matters, with the two 
countries’ interests in offshore oil and gas providing a platform 
for cooperation and joint working.  In diplomatic and security 
terms, the two countries share a commitment to international 
law, peaceful conflict resolution and multilateral approaches 
(see de Carvalho 2011). Although the Brazilian economy is 
undergoing a difficult period, the country’s long term prospects 
remain sound and Dilma Rousseff’s redistribution policies1 
proved popular enough to secure her re-election in October 
2014. However, corruption allegations (see for example Romero 
2014)  and clientilism remain significant issues that affect the 
operating environment for international companies.  Such 
issues, whilst troubling, cannot obscure the potential benefits of 
cooperation on trade and investment.  In this vein, Norway had a 
strong presence at Rio Oil and Gas Week 2014, with Deputy Min-
ister for Petroleum and Energy, Kåre Fostervold attending and 
praising Brazil as “a leading laboratory for global innovation” 
(NBCC 2014).  Bilateral cooperation on oil and gas is under-
pinned by the BN21 Memorandum of Understanding, which 
aims to “Strengthen competences and technology developments 
in oil and gas in both countries” (Engebretsen 2014). Paulo Gui-
maraes, former Minister Counsellor at the Brazilian Embassy in 
Oslo, has noted that the two companies’ long-term outlook and 
responsible approach give them an advantage over other oil 
companies when seeking partnerships in developing countries 
(Guimaraes 2012).  Norway’s reputation as a major player in 
offshore technology is clearly helpful here.
One issue that has the potential to impact on security, trade and 
reputation for both Brazil and Norway is tackling climate change. 
The issue of climate change is of key importance to both Norway and 
Brazil, both in terms of their responsibility as major energy nations 
and as likely affected states.  Norway has to date donated 4.55bn 
NOK to the Amazon Fund in order to aid efforts against deforestation 
in Brazil (Amazon Fund n.d.).  This is to be praised both in terms 
of the significance of the financial support offered and in terms of 
legitimising domestic efforts to combat deforestation (Birdsall et al. 
2014).  The current status of joint working on the environment is 
beneficial in and of itself, whilst also helping Norway’s international 
reputation and credibility with regard to tackling climate change.
Russia: Security concerns key
Norway’s relationship with Russia must be viewed through the 
prism of recent events in Ukraine.  Concerns about Russia’s 
increasing assertiveness—even aggression—are important in 
their own right and in terms of their knock-on effect on trade. 
As Foreign Minister Børge Brende observed in his Foreign Policy 
Address to the Norwegian Parliament, “A new phase in Rus-
sia’s relationship with the rest of the world has begun” (Brende 
2014).  Defence Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide has recently stated 
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that Russia “has demonstrated not only its will but also its 
ability to use military force to achieve political goals outside 
its borders. The trust that Russia has broken, cannot be rebuilt 
in full.” (Eriksen Søreide 2014).  Norway’s concerns about 
Russian foreign policy are of course far from a purely bilat-
eral problem: NATO membership has in the past provided an 
important foundation for positive engagement with Russia 
and will continue to be important in this more turbulent phase 
of the relationship.  For example, Norway and other alliance 
members have observed and responded to increased Russian 
air activity near the edges of NATO air space.
Trade with Russia remains a priority for Norway, despite sanc-
tions imposed by western governments and, as a response, 
Russia.  Of particular relevance for Norway here is Russia’s 
ban on fish imports: Russia and France have been the top two 
importers of Norwegian fish products in recent years (Norwe-
gian Seafood Council 2014).  Despite the security concerns and 
related trade impacts, both governments are conscious of the 
need to work together on issues of mutual interest.  Following 
his meeting with Foreign Minister Brende, the Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov summarized these issues as follows: “we 
confirmed today our mutual interest in developing relations in 
the sphere of economy, cooperate on environmental protection, 
on nuclear and radiation safety, as well as on issues of trans-
border ties” (ITAR-TASS 2014).  This shows that whilst security 
is currently the key driver of the relationship, creating tensions 
in terms of bilateral trade and regional linkages in the north, 
there is nonetheless room for pragmatic cooperation on matters 
that fall outside the harsh glare of the geopolitical spotlight.
India: Prioritising increased engagement
Given India’s huge potential, it is no surprise that strength-
ening bilateral and multilateral cooperation is a priority for 
Norway.  Trade and economic linkages are at present limited. 
The first state visit by the President of India in October was 
a useful step, not least given the signing of nine memoranda 
of understanding on research cooperation and the easing of 
the visa process for Norwegian visitors to India.  The existing 
bilateral agreements on social security and tax are also useful. 
The Modi government’s pursuit of greater inward investment 
provides an opportunity for both Norwegian private compa-
nies and the Pension Fund.  Telenor’s significant presence in 
the Indian market is a useful starting point here.
From a security perspective, India’s positive disposition 
towards multilateral approaches—particularly through the 
UN—makes it a natural partner for Norway.  Indeed, Norway 
explicitly supports India becoming a permanent member of 
the Security Council.  Linking security with trade, the first joint 
defence industry was seminar held in New Delhi in December 
2013. The defence sector was described as “the next logical 
step” in extending Norway’s engagement with India by State 
Secretary Øystein Bø at the seminar (Bø 2013).  Engaging India 
in multilateral approaches to protect human rights and improve 
governance will be important in securing sustainable develop-
ment and inclusive growth.
China: Relationship in recovery
Since 2010 Norway’s relationship with China has been affected 
by the Chinese government’s reaction to Liu Xiabo’s receipt of the 
Nobel Peace Prize.  Foreign Minister Brende has stated that normal-
ising relations with China is a high priority, though acknowledged 
that achieving the desired “close and constructive relationship” 
will take time (Brende 2014).  As the chart above shows, China is 
the major destination of Norwegian exports among the BRICS—as 
well as Norway’s most important trade partner in Asia.  It is worth 
cautioning though that exports to China represented only 1.8% of 
all Norwegian exports in 2013 (SSB 2014) and that negotiations 
on a bilateral free trade agreement have stalled as a result of the 
strained relationship.  On the positive side, the maritime sector 
provides opportunities for solidifying economic ties, with Nor-
wegian shipping companies building 34 vessels and more than 4 
offshore rigs at Chinese shipyards (Ayhan 2014).  
Turning to security, it is notable that both China and Norway had a 
presence at the RIMPAC naval exercises for the first time in 2014. 
In addition to four participating vessels, a Chinese surveillance 
ship shadowed the exercises (US Department of Defense 2014) 
in a demonstration of the duality of the rising power’s potential 
as both security partner and security concern.  With regard to 
reputation, Norway faces a dilemma shared by many states: how 
to improve trade linkages without handing China a free pass on 
human rights and freedom of expression.  International law and 
established multilateral structures remain of key importance to 
Norway and thus China’s assumption of observer status on the 
Arctic Council is a positive development.  
South Africa
Relations between have been close for many years, with South 
Africa one of Norway’s key partners in Africa.  Norway sees South 
Africa as an important partner in its own right and as a link to the 
rest of Sub-Saharan Africa.  Whilst trade between South Africa 
and Norway is the lowest among the BRICS, the two countries 
recently formalised a mechanism for annual high-level political 
consultations on research and economic relations.  From a secu-
rity perspective, Norway and South Africa share a multilateral 
approach to global issues and cooperate closely on human rights 
issues, on disarmament and on climate and environmental 
issues. Norway and South Africa have collaborated closely in 
the area of UN peacekeeping, for instance, and Norway has been 
an active contributor to rebuilding think tanks in South Africa 
over the past decades with a view to increase African capacity 
for handling security challenges (see Solli et al.  For example, 
in 2013 the Norwegian-owned company Scatec Solar opened 
Africa’s largest solar power plant. 
Conclusion
A high level, state-by-state summary of Norway’s involvement 
with the BRICS shows the need for Norway to engage strategically 
with these countries. While some of them, such as Brazil and 
South Africa represent cases where cooperation is going well, 
and where mutual interests are served by current arrangements, 
we need to keep in mind the extent to which such a state of affairs 
builds on long-term cooperation on key issues of mutual interest 
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(see the discussion in Domingos and de Carvalho 2012). The 
situation with Russia is on-going, but points to the need for 
Norway to strengthen multilateral arenas in which to engage 
with Russia. Norway has successfully engaged with Russia 
in low-key cooperation of issues of mutual concern in the 
past and in this way fostered increased cooperation in other 
issue-areas. This may be a strategy that Norway should con-
tinue. With China, the relationship is normalizing. However, 
as China becomes more involved in the Arctic, Norway could 
easily again land in a position where its stated position  on a 
specific issue may lead to a more tense relationship.
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